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Transnational Citizenship and Rights of Political Participation 
 
by David Owen 
 
 
The past thirty years have seen dramatic changes to the character of state 
membership regimes in which practices of easing access to membership for 
resident non-citizens, extending the franchise to expatriate citizens as well as, 
albeit in typically more limited ways, to resident non-citizens and an increasing 
toleration of dual nationality have become widespread.
1 These processes of 
democratic inclusion, while variously motivated, represent an important trend 
in the contemporary political order in which we can discern two distinct shifts. 
The first concerns membership as a status and is characterised in terms of 
the movement from a simple distinction between single-nationality citizens 
and single-nationality aliens to a more complex structure of state membership 
in which we also find dual nationals and denizens (Baubock, 2007a:2395-6). 
The second shift relates to voting rights and is marked by the movement from 
the requirement that voting rights are grounded in both citizenship and 
residence to the relaxing of the joint character of this requirement such that 
citizenship or residence now increasingly serve as a basis for, at least partial, 
enfranchisement.
2 In the light of these transformations, it is unsurprising that 
normative engagement with transnational citizenship – conceived in terms of 
the enjoyment of membership statuses in two (or more) states – has focused 
on the issues of access to, and maintenance of, national citizenship, on the 
one hand
3, and entitlement to voting rights, on the other hand.
4
                                                 
1 For recent overviews of these changes and the reasons for them see Baubock 2005 & 2007, Joppke 
2010, and chapter 6 in Stoker et al. 2011 (of which I was lead-author). 
 Yet this 
framing of debates on transnational citizenship comes with three sets of costs 
attached. First, the identification of full political membership with national 
citizenship elides an important distinction between these concepts in ways 
that is, I’ll argue, consequential for a conflict within normative debates on 
transnational citizenship which I’ll refer to as the antinomy of incorporation. 
Second, the focus on voting rights – for all their symbolic and practical 
2 See Baubock 2005 & 2007 and chapter 6 of Stoker et al. 2011 
3 See Rubio-Marin 2000, Carens 2005, Baubock 1994, 2003, 2005 & 2007. 
4 See Beckmann 2006, Rubio-Marin 2007 and Baubock 2007 3 
 
significance – occludes the more general terrain of rights of political 
participation. Third, the restrictive understanding of membership invoked in 
this discussion means that it fails to address adequately the issues raised by 
the standing of non-resident non-citizens whose morally significant interests 
are adversely affected by the decisions of states. The task of this essay is to 
try to reframe the debate on transnational citizenship in a way that takes 
account of these costs and thereby allows for a more nuanced account of 
different modes of membership, one that acknowledges that distinct grounds 
of entitlement to participation in political society can legitimate differentiated 
sets of rights of political participation and, hence, diverse modes of 
membership. 
 
On Political Participation 
We can begin by briefly distinguishing two types of reasons – protective and 
expressive - for valuing political participation and their implications for how we 
conceive of rights of political participation.  
 
Protective reasons which emphasise the instrumental value of political 
participation as the primary medium through which the governed seek to 
express, in various idioms and registers, their consent to, or dissent from, the 
ways in which they are governed and attempt to shape how they are 
governed, that is, the form and content of the regime of rule to which they are 
subject. From the perspective of protective reasons, rights of political 
participation are instrumentally valuable insofar as they protect the governed 
against tyrannical rule by securing the basic institutional conditions of those 
legitimate and effective forms of political participation through which those 
who are governed can govern how they are governed.   
 
Expressive reasons stress the non-instrumental value of political participation 
insofar as it is constitutive of the (intrinsic) good of belonging to the political 
community; a good which is manifest in the relations of civic friendship (for 
example, bonds of trust and solidarity) among the members of the political 
community. Within the framework of expressive reasons, rights of political 
participation may be seen as instrumentally valuable insofar as they secure 4 
 
the conditions for the governed to engage in political participation and so 
realise the good of political community, but they may also be seen as 
themselves non-instrumentally valuable insofar as they are understood as a 
form of civic recognition which is expressive, and partially constitutive, of the 
good of belonging to a political community. The thought here is that just as the 
good of personal friendship is partly constituted by the acknowledgement of 
the relevant parties of rights and duties that they owe to each other, so too is 
the good of civic friendship; the distinction between the two forms of friendship 
is that in the civic case, (some of) these rights and duties are given public 
institutional expression. 
 
These are not the only reasons that may be adduced for valuing rights of 
political participation but they are the most central to my concerns and help to 
draw attention to two distinct aspects under which we conceive of the state, 
namely, as a regime of rule and as a form (or site) of community. In the case 
of the democratic constitutional state, this gives rise to specific characteristics. 
On the one hand, it is a regime of rule in which the governed also govern. 
Democracy is a form of reflexive authority in which those who are subject to 
authority are those who authorise the authority to which they are subject. On 
the other hand, the form of democratic political community is that of a free 
community of equals for whom the good of belonging to a political community 
is comprised of the relations of liberty, equality and fraternity that are 
constitutive of a democratic political community.  
 
The presumption of normative democratic theory has been that national 
citizens of a democratic state will typically share both protective and 
expressive reasons for valuing political participation. Such citizens will have a 
legitimate interest in, and claim to, membership of the democratic state as a 
regime of rule and also have a legitimate interest in, and claim to, 
membership of the democratic state as a political community. However, in the 
context of transnational citizenship, this presumption becomes problematic 
because the class of habitual residents of the state is not identical to the class 
of national citizens of the state. Resident non-citizens may have protective 
reasons for valuing political participation that express their claim to 5 
 
membership of the democratic state as a regime of rule to which they are 
subject without having expressive reasons for valuing political participation. In 
contrast, non-resident citizens may have (largely) expressive reasons for 
valuing political participation that express their claim to membership of the 
democratic state as a political community. In other words, reflection on 
transnational citizenship directs us to a concern not merely with degrees of 
political membership but also with modes of political membership in the 
democratic state. One way of characterising the central claim of this article is 
that it represents the contention that the question of what constitute legitimate 
degrees of political membership for transnational citizens in the states to 
which they belong cannot be adequately addressed separately from 
discussion of the different modes of membership at issue in their relationship 
to these states.   
 
Normative Framings of Transnational Citizenship 
Within discussions of transnational citizenship, the articulation of grounds of 
entitlement to full political membership (typically construed as national 
citizenship) have clustered around the principle that all persons who are 
subject to the coercive authority of the democratic state (or, to accommodate 
the EU, the polity) should be entitled, at least after a limited period of 
residence (for example, the EU norm of 5 years), to membership of the state. 
We can distinguish three positions that cluster around the all subjected 
persons principle: the all-subjected persons principle itself, the social 
membership principle and the stakeholder principle. I’ll address each in turn. 
 
The classic argument for the incorporation of habitual residents is provided by 
Robert Dahl’s argument for the ‘principle of full inclusion’: ‘The demos must 
include all adult members of the association except transients and persons 
proved to be mentally defective’ (1989: 129), where ‘adult members of the 
association’ refers to ‘all adults subject to the binding collective decisions of 
the association’ (1989: 120). In the context of a democratic polity 
characterised in part by authority over a territorial jurisdiction, Dahl’s account 
implies that any competent adult who is habitually resident within the territory 
of the polity and, hence, subject to the laws and policies of its government is 6 
 
entitled to full inclusion within the demos.
5 Such an argument can be taken to 
underwrite Walzer’s claim that the denial of full political rights to legally-
admitted habitual residents amounts to citizen tyranny (Walzer, 1983:55).
6
 
 
It has been contended by Lopez-Guerra that, given Dahl’s formulation of the 
principle of full inclusion, ‘the demos of a democratic polity must exclude all 
individuals who are not subject to the laws, together with transients and 
persons proved incapable of taking part in the decision-making process’ (2005: 
225). Lopez-Guerra’s grounds for this claim are based on the view that, given 
the territorial jurisdiction of the state, being resident on the territory of the state 
is a necessary (as well as sufficient) condition for being subject to the 
collectively binding decisions of the state. Consequently, he argues that:  
Debates so far have focused only on the necessity of granting political 
rights to all residents. They have ignored the implication that this 
requires the exclusion of long-term expatriates. (2005: 234, my 
emphasis) 
Unsurprisingly, this required exclusion encourages the view that citizenship 
should be granted on a jus domicile basis. 
 
The fundamental problem with the interpretation of the all subjected principle 
that Lopez-Guerra offers is that being present on the territory of a state is not 
a necessary condition for being subject to its collectively binding decisions. To 
illustrate this, consider the following (real) examples: 
1)  The event that motivates Lopez-Guerra’s own article, namely, the 
Mexican referendum on expatriate voting. 
2)  The current UK Coalition government proposal to introduce a decent 
flat rate state pension which is payable only to UK citizens who are 
resident in the UK. 
Who is subject to these collectively binding decisions? The answer is obvious: 
all citizens, irrespective of the residential status. Hence, while habitual 
                                                 
5 Although Dahl talks of the principle of all affected interests, I agree with Lopez-Guerra (2005: 222-5) 
that since it is being governed that is the normatively relevant issue for Dahl, the relevant principle is 
that of being subjected to rule rather than affected by rule. 
6 Walzer links this claim to one in which the polity has the right to determine its own entry criteria as 
an element of its right to self-determination; for an excellent analysis of the difficulties that this 
conjunction generates, see Bosniak (2006).  7 
 
residence is a sufficient condition of subjection to the political authority of the 
state, it is not a necessary condition. More generally, states are a form of 
polity which combine authoritative rules that are conceptually dependant on 
residency, rules that are conceptually dependant on non-residency and rules 
that are conceptually independent of one’s residential status (though they may 
be residence-sensitive)
7
 
. Thus, for example, the relationship between a state 
and its national citizens involves some rights and obligations that are 
necessarily dependent on residence (i.e, those arising from any law that 
pertains to actions involving the physical presence of the person with the 
state), some that are necessarily dependent on non-residence (i.e., the right 
to re-entry and to diplomatic protection) and some that are residence-
indifferent (e.g., paying tax on property owned in the state). One of the 
political choices that a state can make with respect to issues that are not 
conceptually tied either to presence on, or absence from, the territory of the 
state is whether or not to treat them as residence-neutral. So the fact that Joe 
lives in state F rather than in state H of which he is a national citizen, while his 
brother and co-national Fred resides in state H does not mean that Joe is not, 
while Fred is, subject to the authoritative decisions of state H regarding the 
entitlements, privileges, powers and immunities (and their correlatives) that 
make up the legal character of citizens of state H. On the contrary, Joe and 
Fred are both subject to the political authority of state H. What differentiates 
them is, rather, the specific laws, rights and duties that currently apply to them 
in virtue of their distinct residence statuses. 
Notice though that this argument only establishes that citizens are subject to 
the political authority of the state whose nationality they hold. Yet since it is 
only in virtue of the fact that, under current citizenship rules, national 
citizenship is retained by expatriates that they are subject to political authority 
of the state, the argument thus far is unable to account for why expatriates 
should be entitled to retain national citizenship of this state. A jus domicile rule 
                                                 
7 A residence-sensitive rule is one that while not conceptually tied to residence is practically related to 
residence in terms of its application. Thus, for example, in the 19
th century, the inability of expatriates 
to stay up to date with the politics of their home states and participate at a distance in its public political 
discussions would have reasonably grounded the claim that voting rights should be tied to residence 
even though it is not conceptually tied to residence.  I am grateful to Rainer Baubock for pressing this 
point on me. 8 
 
such as Lopez-Guerra favours would equally meet the basic normative 
requirement that everyone is entitled to equal membership in a self-governing 
political community. The same type of objection is made by Baubock who 
argues that ‘”all subjected persons” is too conservative in presupposing the 
legitimacy of given boundaries’ (2009: 480-1) The limitation of the all-
subjected persons principle exposed by these critical remarks is that it 
addresses the question of who should be entitled to political membership 
given an existing structure of political authority and allocation of citizenship, 
not the question of who should be entitled to national citizenship in the first 
place. If we are to develop a criteria for entitlement to national citizenship, the 
all-subjected persons principle needs supplementation. This limitation is, in 
part, a product of the fact that the all-subjected persons principle represents 
an exclusive focus on the democratic state as a regime of rule. In different 
ways, the social membership and stakeholder principles may be seen as 
attempts to overcome the problem posed by this limitation in ways that 
acknowledge the value of the democratic state as a site of political community. 
In the case of the stakeholder principle, this is done directly by specifying the 
idea of stakeholding in terms of a relationship between the autonomy and/or 
well-being of an individual and the future of the polity. In the case of the social 
membership principle, with which I begin, it is done indirectly through an 
appeal to the salience of social membership.  
 
The social membership argument is advanced by Rubio-Marin (2000) and 
Carens (1989 & 2005) as asserting the principle that people have a moral 
right to be citizens of any society of which they are members’ (Carens, 1989: 
32). The basis of this claim is twofold. First, the general social fact that living 
in a society makes one a member of a society since as one forges 
connections and attachments, one’s interests become interlinked with those of 
other members of the society (Rubio-Marin, 2000: 21 & 31-34; Carens, 2005: 
33 & 39). Second, in living in given society, one is subject to the political 
authority of the state and, consequently, on democratic grounds, should have 
access to full political rights within the political community of that state (Rubio-
Marin, 2000: 28-30; Carens, 2005: 39). 
 9 
 
These arguments are, in several respects, compelling. Moreover, they give 
rise to the claim – implied by Walzer (1983), advanced by Rubio-Marin (2000) 
and now accepted by Carens (2005) - that neither the conferral nor the 
acquisition of such rights should be optional. The former element rules out 
selective practices such as citizenship tests on the grounds that while a 
society can legitimately entertain the reasonable expectation that immigrants 
will acquire its language and knowledge of its political institutions, it is 
unreasonable to make acquisition of civic rights conditional on meeting what 
can only be reasonable expectations given, for example, the differential 
linguistic abilities of persons.
8 The latter element rules out the possibility of 
choosing not to acquire such rights on the grounds that such a choice 
represents voluntary subjection to a condition of political servitude and, hence, 
is incompatible with the autonomy-valuing character of liberal democratic 
states.
9
 
 
Further, although the social membership argument was developed in relation 
to resident non-citizens, it can be extended to address wider issues of 
membership. It is in this extension that its acknowledgement of the non-
instrumental value of membership comes to the fore. Thus, for example, 
drawing on the social dimension of the argument, Rubio-Marin (2006) has 
argued that, in respect of states of origin, expatriates should have a right to 
retain their nationality of origin even when they naturalise in their state of 
residence on the basis that, generally speaking, membership of the state of 
origin is a source of non-instrumental value for them as well as its 
instrumental value in terms of visiting family and supporting the possibility of 
return migration. We can extend this argument to reasons for the state of 
residence also to accept a right to retention of the original nationality when 
naturalising, namely, that precisely because membership of the state of origin 
is typically a significant source of non-instrumental and instrumental value for 
its emigrant population, requiring them to surrender it will generate an unfair 
distribution of burdens between native citizens and immigrants in terms of 
                                                 
8 For a defence of citizenship tests, see Miller (2008) and for critiques see Carens (2005: 38-9) and 
Seglow (2008) 
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their capacity to enjoy the social attachments that matter to them – and, 
consequently, undermine social cohesion (cf. Rubio-Marin, 2006: 138). 
 
The second supplementary alternative to the all-subjected persons principle is 
the stakeholder principle proposed by Baubock which expresses the claim 
that ‘self-governing political communities should include as citizens those 
individuals whose circumstances of life link their individual autonomy or well-
being to the common good of the political community.’ (Baubock, 20089: 479). 
This principle of inclusion is based on the following thought: 
… in a self-governing polity, each individual member has a stake in the 
future of that polity in a dual sense. First, each individual’s autonomy or 
well-being depends to a large degree on how well political institutions 
work in guaranteeing equal liberties and in providing equal 
opportunities for all subjected to their authority. Second, citizens can 
collectively shape the future course of the polity through political 
participation and by holding political authorities accountable. (Baubock, 
2009: 479) 
In practical terms, Baubock proposes that those ‘persons and only those 
persons have a claim to citizenship in a particular political community who (a) 
depend on that community for long-term protection of their basic rights 
(dependency criterion) or (b) are or have been subjected to that community’s 
political authorities for a significant period over the course of their lives 
(biographical subjection criterion).’ (Baubock, 2009: 479) We can notice first 
that since first generation migrants are generally stakeholders in both their 
countries of origin and of habitual residence, this principle supports dual 
nationality. Given the role of family in socialisation, it is plausible to argue that 
second generation migrants are also stakeholders, however by the third 
generation, this claim is harder to sustain independent of specific actions on 
the part of the third generation migrant (such as going to live in the state of 
their grandparent’s origin). Thus, the stakeholder principle would extend the 
automatic jus sangunis transmission of citizenship to second generation 
migrants but not further (Baubock, 2007a).  
 11 
 
In contrast to the social membership argument, the stakeholder principle does 
not appeal to social ties and attachments but to directly political ties. Baubock 
offers two reasons for rejecting the social membership argument in favour of 
the stakeholder principle. The first concerns the increasing problems faced by 
the concept of a bounded state society in contexts of migrant transnationalism 
and global interactions. Baubock comments that it may appear ‘somewhat 
circular if we derive claims to political membership from factual societal 
membership, but then have to refer to given political boundaries in order to 
define societies in the first place.’ (2009: 482) The second is that while the 
social membership argument ‘would substantiate immigrants’ claim to 
citizenship, it cannot account for long-term external membership’ when 
conducted in terms of a statist conception of society, while opening out the 
notion of societal membership beyond such a statist outlook through appeals 
to notions like family ties ‘begs the question why other networks across 
borders, such as business connections, should not also be regarded as forms 
of societal membership.’ (Baubock, 2009: 482). Even if we accept the first of 
these criticisms, it is not clear that the two points suffice to knockdown the 
social membership argument as opposed to provide reasons for its 
reformulation. Hints towards such a reformulation can already be seen in 
Rubio-Marin’s reflections on dual nationality and we can offer the following 
restatement of the social membership argument:  
social membership is characterised by non-instrumentally valuable 
social attachments and ties that arise from one’s (past or present) 
residence within the territory of the state (or by way of socialisation 
through parents who were residents of the state in question) and which 
link one’s well-being to the well-being of the (typically transnational) 
society comprised of all persons characterised by non-instrumentally 
valuable social attachments and ties that arise from their (past or 
present) residence within the territory of the state (or by way of 
socialisation through parents who were residents of the state in 
question). 
This reformulation of the social membership argument does not appeal to the 
problematic concept of a bounded state society but simply to the non-
instrumental value and site of genesis of those social relations that comprise a 12 
 
form of social solidarity, yet since the state remains central to the well-being of 
this society, the social membership argument may still ground claims to 
political inclusion. Such a reformulation avoids Baubock’s criticisms and, 
hence, we may take both the revised social membership principle and the 
stakeholder principle to represent live positions in the debate on transnational 
citizenship. 
 
Citizenship, Membership and Resident Non-Citizens 
Notably both advocates of the social membership and the stakeholder 
principles align political membership with national citizenship – and this gives 
raise to a further dispute between their respective advocates which is more 
immediately consequential for the concerns of this article. The issue at stake 
in this dispute concerns whether the resident non-citizen who has legally 
abided in the state for the relevant period should be automatic entitled to take 
up national citizenship or automatically required to adopt national citizenship. 
Arguments for automatic mandatory citizenship have been advanced by 
Rubio-Marin and Carens which, albeit on slightly different grounds, stress the 
problem of citizen tyranny, while Baubock has argued that there are good 
sociological reasons for thinking that it is important for social and political 
integration that immigrant’s make a public voluntary commitment to naturalise 
and, thereby, ‘visibly link their own future with that of the country of settlement’. 
Both of these arguments have considerable force. But rather than attempt to 
resolve this dispute by demonstrating the rational superiority of one position 
over the other, I would like to try the tactic of dissolving the dispute by 
showing that we can endorse both positions. The central pivot for this tactic is 
the fact that this antinomy of incorporation arises precisely because both 
identify political membership with national citizenship. Consequently, one way 
of  negotiating this conflict is thus to drop this identification and note that 
neither the all-subjected persons principle or its supplemental variants strictly 
entail naturalization as the route to political membership, they simply entail 
political membership – and there is a non-trivial distinction between political 
membership and national citizenship since the latter, but not the former, 
automatically includes the ‘external rights’ of diplomatic protection and 
automatic right of re-entry to the state as well as the automatic entitlement to 13 
 
pass nationality on to their children via the jus sanguinis provisions that states 
have almost universally and justifiably adopted as part of their nationality laws. 
Thus, we may hold both that there is a compelling argument for the mandated 
acquisition of full political rights or political membership (which ought, in the 
case of resident non-citizens, to confer an automatic entitlement to the 
acquisition of the status of national citizenship), but also that the acquisition of 
national citizenship itself should involve a voluntary act on the part of the 
immigrant. The additional features of national citizenship fit the rationale for a 
voluntary act since their value is immanently related to the immigrant’s seeing 
their relationship to the state as not simply instrumental valuable in protecting 
them against domination but also as non-instrumentally valuable and, hence, 
as providing reasons for linking one’s own future well-being with that of the 
state. However, two significant objections have been proposed to this method 
of dissolving the antinomy of incorporation.
10
 
  
The first objection concerns mandated membership and points out that  
denizens are not non-citizens but combine a bundle of extensive quasi-
citizenship rights in the country of residence with external citizenship rights in 
a country of origin. Their denizenship rights include a right to optional 
naturalisation. The objection is thus that this bundle should sufficiently secure 
their political autonomy. Under this condition, not to make use of their right to 
naturalisation can be seen as akin to enjoying voting rights but not making 
use of them. To put this point the other way round, an argument for 
mandatory naturalisation would have to meet the same objections as 
arguments for mandatory voting. Paternalistic arguments for mandatory 
naturalisation or voting are not necessarily illiberal, but they should be 
grounded on contextual evidence that sufficient inclusion cannot be achieved 
otherwise.  
 
In response to the first objection, it is important to distinguish between 
conditions of political autonomy and exercises of political autonomy. In the 
example of mandatory voting, the argument against the practice swings on 
                                                 
10 I am grateful to Rainer Baubock for raising these objections and I draw on his formulations of them 
in presenting them here. 14 
 
the fact that in non-mandatory systems, both voting and not voting are 
expressions of political autonomy and, hence, while argument for mandatory 
voting may be plausible, their normative force won’t be grounded directly on 
an appeal to political autonomy (though it may be indirectly so grounded). By 
contrast, on the account I offer, political membership is a condition of political 
autonomy, the decision whether to acquire or not acquire political membership 
may both be expressions of individual autonomy but they are not exercises of 
political autonomy. Hence, on this view, the question is whether people should 
be entitled as a matter of personal autonomy to place themselves in 
conditions of political servitude. I see no reason to accept that claim. 
 
This initial response, however, depends on the claim that full political 
membership is a necessary condition of political autonomy – and it is not clear 
that this claim is sustainable. While it is reasonable to take the claim to hold in 
the case of ‘birthright’ citizens who hold no other nationality or ‘stateless’ 
residents, the condition of the denizen is quite distinct. The objection suggests 
that the quasi-citizenship enjoyed by denizens combined with their external 
citizenship rights in their country of origin suffice for political autonomy, that is, 
they have external rights of diplomatic protection and of return combined with 
local voting rights and, typically, some general rights of political participation. 
If this is the case, it would seem perverse to deny that denizens enjoy some 
degree of political autonomy and to insist that full political membership is a 
necessary condition of political autonomy as such. Admitting this point does 
not settle the argument though since once we admit that there are degrees of 
political autonomy, the pressing question becomes what counts as an 
acceptable threshold.  
 
Here I think it is worthwhile to return to Dahl’s argument concerning the strong 
principle of equality. The relevant point is that Dahl’s argument makes no 
reference to citizenship; the criterion for membership to which it appeals is 
subjection to the collectively binding decisions of the polity. While it is the 
case that resident non-citizens are not subject to all the collectively-binding 
decisions of the polity, it is also true that, given the territorial dimension of the 
state, a large (and consequential) array of residence-based laws are binding 15 
 
on resident non-citizens. In this respect, one way of reflecting on the issue of 
the threshold of political autonomy is to note that denizens are situated in 
different contexts of political autonomy – that of the state of origin and the 
state of residence – and although some very basic features of political 
autonomy in the state of residence may be protected through the right of 
diplomatic protection granted by the state of origin (and the spread of human 
rights norms), this is hardly sufficient to secure a relevant degree of political 
autonomy in the context of the state of residence. Considering a related issue 
raised in relation to dual nationals who have voting rights in both states of 
their nationality may help to clarify this point. Here the question is raised as to 
whether this practice breaches the principle of equality since these dual 
nationals have two votes. The appropriate response is that although they 
have two votes, the votes are cast in distinct electoral contests and, hence, 
the principle of equality is not breached since, as long as the votes do not 
both contribute, directly or indirectly, to the selection of representatives from 
both states to a supra-national level of governance (as in the case of the EU), 
the relevant context of application of the principle of the equality is a specific 
polity (cf. Baubock, 2007: 2428). By the same token, as long as the relevant 
states are not linked in a supra-national union, the appropriate threshold for 
political autonomy in a state of residence is given by the application of the 
principle of equality in that polity – and this, at the very least, supports a 
strong presumption in favour of full political membership for resident non-
citizens.  
 
Even if we admit that there may be forms of political incorporation that are 
sufficient to secure the relevant conditions of political autonomy but fall short 
of full membership, this does not undermine the argument for mandatory 
inclusion. On the contrary, it simply revises the principle to state that whatever 
degree of incorporation in the political community is necessary for securing 
political autonomy can legitimately be a matter of automatic mandatory 
inclusion. If it is the case that the quasi-citizenship enjoyed by denizens 
combined with their external citizenship rights in their country of origin suffice 
for political autonomy, then the relevant membership rights (e.g., local voting 
rights and, typically, some general rights of political participation) are not 16 
 
optional (and it is notable that the objection assumes that these rights are not 
optional.) If it is the case, as I have suggested, that full membership rights are 
required, then these are equally not optional. 
 
The second objection applies to the proposed solution, that is, the distinction 
of mandated political membership and voluntary national citizenship, as 
paradoxical on the grounds that it  suggests that migrants ought to express 
their commitment to the polity through naturalisation but the incentives for 
choosing a status of national citizenship are to gain rights that can be 
exercised from abroad rather than from within, and civil rights and liberties in 
which individuals have clearly instrumental interests rather than political 
participation rights whose exercise would express a commitment to the 
polity.
11
                                                 
11 Notice that this objection can entertain the thought that rights to return and diplomatic protection 
should not be an exclusive privilege of national citizenship but could be included in denizenship and 
thus acquired automatically instead of having to be chosen through naturalisation. (On Baubock’s view, 
such external denizenship rights would, however, not be for life, so that national citizens would still 
enjoy a specific recognition as permanent stakeholders.) The objection is also compatible with resisting 
the claim that national voting rights ought to be granted only to born or voluntarily naturalised citizens, 
since if the defense of optional naturalisation as a choice to be made by first generation migrants is 
successful, then the question of which rights remain attached to full citizenship can be answered in 
different ways. 
 This is, I think, slightly point-missing. To see this, note that a migrant 
may have two quite different relations to the polity in which it is seen as either 
instrumentally valuable (as a regime of rule) or non-instrumentally valuable 
(as a political community) from the first person standpoint. On my account, if 
the migrant’s relationship to the polity is instrumental, then the migrant has an 
interest in, and claim to, adequate conditions of political autonomy but has no 
interest in binding his future well-being to the fate of the polity which is 
precisely what is expressed in the additional rights and obligations involved in 
national citizenship. On the other hand, if the migrant’s relationship to the 
polity is such that it is not only instrumentally valuable but also non-
instrumentally valuable, then this grounds an interest in, and claim to, national 
citizenship. It is not here a matter of providing incentives, but rather of 
allowing for two different modes of membership of the polity, acknowledging 
the legitimate claims of each, and marking that distinction in a way that 
respects the difference. 
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Reflecting on these objections does not then, in my view, undermine the 
cogency of the distinction between mandatory political membership and 
voluntary national citizenship as a way of dissolving the tension raised by the 
advocates of the social membership and stakeholder principles. What it may 
do, however, is point to a need to distinguish different degrees of political 
membership – and this is a topic to which I will return in raising the issue of 
the need to move beyond reflection on voting rights. However, before we turn 
to that topic, it is relevant to address the disjuncture between political 
membership and national citizenship from the standpoint of a concern not with 
resident non-citizens but with non-resident citizens. 
 
Citizenship, Membership and Non-resident Citizens 
Intriguingly, theorists of transnational citizenship are more willing to entertain 
the salience of the distinction between political membership and national 
citizenship in the case of non-resident citizens. This is, I think, essentially 
because while the case of expatriates has also focused around national voting 
rights, the debate here has been structured not by the question of whether 
democratic exclusion of residents can be justified (as in the case of resident 
non-citizens) but whether democratic inclusion of non-resident citizens can be 
justified. I have already discussed and rejected Lopez-Guarra’s claim that 
expatriates are not subject to the political authority of their state of origin and, 
hence, should be automatically excluded from the demos. But the fact that the 
exclusion of expatriates is not required does not entail that their inclusion – in 
terms of national voting rights – is required. So what position is defensible? I 
will critically consider two leading arguments. 
 
The first is offered by Rubio-Marin who argues that: 
Democratic legitimacy and popular sovereignty require that the people 
subject to the law and state authority be included, as a matter of right, 
in the process of shaping how that authority will be formed and 
exercised. The exercise of public authority affects mostly those who 
live subject to the jurisdiction of such authority. Since states are 
geographically bounded communities and their borders express the 18 
 
limits of their jurisdictions, democratic states generally have good 
reasons to restrict participation in the political process to those who 
reside within their territorial borders. This would then justify the 
exclusion of expatriates from the political process as they are not 
directly and comprehensively affected by the decisions and policies 
that their participation would help to bring about even if they are likely 
to be affected by some of those decisions, such as those concerning 
remittances, nationality, and military service laws. (2006: 129) 
This argument is curiously constructed since it moves between appeals to 
being subjected to law and being affected by law. On the one hand, Rubio-
Marin claims that those subject to the political authority of the state should, as 
a matter of right, be included. On the other hand, she then moves to address 
the topic purely in terms of affectedness.  
 
To make sense of this movement, it may help to return to the point that 
expatriates are subject to the political authority of the state of origin. Consider 
that since expatriates are subject to the collectively binding decisions of the 
state, Dahl’s principle of strong equality would prima facie  require their 
inclusion within the demos. This is because the principle treats subjection in a 
non-scalar way, that is, it is not a matter of how much you are subject to 
collectively-binding decisions (the extent of the range of laws that apply to you) 
but, rather, that you are subject to collectively-binding decisions. Yet Dahl’s 
principle was formulated against the background assumption that individuals 
are broadly equally positioned in terms of the range of laws to which they are 
subject and this assumption is simply not valid in the context of non-resident 
citizens. If we drop this assumption,  it becomes reasonable to argue that 
scalar considerations can enter into the argument which address both the 
extent of the laws to which you are subject and the consequentiality of these 
laws for your autonomy and well-being.  It is, I think, something like this 
argument which can make coherent and cogent Rubio-Marin’s contention that 
it is the fact that expatriates are not ‘directly and comprehensively affected’ by 
the policies of the state of origin that legitimates their exclusion from national 
voting rights.     
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However, while Rubio-Marin’s argument provides a basis for the claim that 
expatriates can be legitimately excluded, it does not entail their exclusion 
(2006: 134). The most plausible construal of Rubio-Marin’s point is that under 
conditions in which  it is possible for expatriates to engage in informed and 
up-to-date decision-making to made, for ongoing ties to be maintained and for 
return to be a real option (and hence it is possible for expatriates to satisfy the 
conditions of responsibility and consequentiality in relation to voting), 
democratic inclusion of expatriate citizens is a legitimate way of recognizing 
the non-instrumental attachment to the society of their home states that she 
takes to be a widespread and typical feature of first-generation emigrants 
(2006: 142). The justification would be that even though expatriates are not 
‘directly and comprehensively affected’ by state policies, they are subject to its 
authority and since their individual well-being is non-contingently related to the 
well-being of the society of the home state, its policies are consequential for 
them. Notice though that this argument leaves unaddressed the question of 
who is entitled to make the decision concerning who is to be included in the 
demos (or, more precisely, national franchise) in effect simply assuming that 
this is a matter for the current demos (however constituted). 
 
The second argument is offered by Baubock who also claims that expatriate 
voting is neither required nor forbidden by justice. Consider two sets of 
remarks. In the first remarks Baubock reiterates the stakeholder principle: 
The notion of stakeholding expresses, first, the idea that citizens have 
not merely fundamental interests in the outcomes of the political 
process, but a claim to be represented as participants in that process. 
Second, stakeholding serves as a criterion for assessing claims to 
membership and voting rights. Individuals whose circumstances of life 
link their future well-being to the flourishing of a particular polity should 
be recognized as stakeholders in that polity with a claim to participate 
in collective decision-making processes that shape the shared future of 
this political community. (Baubock, 2007: ) 
This passage suggests that stakeholders have a legitimate claim to participate, 
although this does not rule out either that the reach of this claim (i.e., the 20 
 
extent of participation it legitimates) may vary or that it may be defeated by 
other legitimate concerns. In the second set of remarks, Baubock comments: 
In a stakeholder conception of democratic community, persons with 
multiple stakes need multiple votes to control each of the governments 
whose decisions will affect their future as members of several demoi. 
This applies, on the one hand, to federally nested demoi where citizens 
can cast multiple vertical votes on several levels and, on the other 
hand, to the demoi of independent states with overlapping membership. 
(Baubock, 2007: ) 
This suggests a stronger view, namely, that the stakeholder principle supports 
a requirement of inclusion in the demos for stakeholders, where we may 
surmise this requirement would be legitimately subject only to (a) the basic 
constraint that such inclusion does not threaten the stability of the state (i.e., 
its capacity to reproduce itself as a self-governing polity over time) and (b) 
feasibility constraints. This stronger view is more in line with the my remarks 
concerning contexts of political autonomy advanced in the previous section, 
yet Baubock does not adopt this stance, remaining content with the view that 
expatriate voting is permissible but not required, although acknowledging the 
normative salience of existing state practices of expatriate enfranchisement 
as having constructed reasonable expectations which it would be unjust to 
frustrate given the normative permissibility of the practice. Overall, the most 
one can say is that, for Baubock, the stakeholder principles broadly supports 
a presumption in favour of such rights for first generation migrants but 
acknowledges that this presumption can be either supported or defeated by a 
wide range of factors relating the specific circumstances of the polity 
(Baubock, 2007).  
 
However, a problem arises in relation to Baubock’s stance on permissibility in 
which it is simply up to the democratic state to determine whether or not to 
allow expatriate voting, while, in addition, Baubock  also argues  that 
democratic states should have the freedom to introduce conditions ‘such as 
length of residence in the country, maximum duration of residence abroad, or 
an intention to return (however difficult this may be to verify)’. (Baubock, 2007:) 21 
 
This implies that  the current demos has  the right to determine  not only 
whether non-resident stakeholders are to be granted national voting rights but 
also, if such rights are granted, which of these stakeholders is entitled to them. 
But what justifies that view? After all, all national citizens, resident or not, will 
be bound by the decision. 
 
The basic limitation in the arguments of both Rubio-Marin and of Baubock is 
that they don’t focus on the question of who is entitled to determine whether 
or not expatriates are included in the national franchise. They both assume 
that this is, practically speaking, a matter of whatever contingent 
specifications of the demos currently hold but provide no normative basis for 
the legitimacy of this view. What is required is a principled (i.e., non-arbitrary) 
basis on which to determine who is entitled to decide on this question. Here it 
is worth noting that there is one type of decision by any polity which not only 
binds all citizens irrespective of residence but also directs concerns their very 
status as citizens, namely, constitutional laws that  specify the entitlements 
and obligations of citizens – such as, for example, laws on nationality and 
expatriate voting rights. Moreover, since it concerns the status of citizenship 
itself, in the case of such decisions concerning the fundamental character of 
the civil association to deny any (competent) citizen or group of citizens the 
right to participate as an equal member of the democratic community in the 
decision-making process is to deny their status as a citizen, it is to subject 
them to an alien form of rule. The only legitimate basis for such decision as 
decisions on expatriate voting is, thus, that all citizens are entitled to inclusion 
irrespective of their residential status (although this does not rule out that 
considerations of feasibility and cost may legitimately allow the requirement 
that votes are cast within the territory of the home state). This universality rule 
provides the principled basis that is lacking from Rubio-Marin’s and Baubock’s 
arguments.   
 
Does this rule  also apply to Baubock’s further reflections concerning 
discriminations  within the class of non-resident citizens?  If such 
discriminations are permissible, the rule will apply. However, whether the 22 
 
discriminations are permissible hangs on whether we conceive them as 
contextual determinations of the abstract stakeholder principle by distinct 
democratic communities or as discriminations within the class of emigrant 
stakeholders. In the former case, they are permissible  since the abstract 
stakeholder principle does require democratically legitimate contextual 
determination; in the latter case, they may not be permissible since 
presumptively they breach the principle of equality with respect to the class of 
emigrant stakeholders. While we may have hold reasons for accepting that 
the principle of equality is compatible with different political entitlements for 
resident and non-resident stakeholders, it is not obviously the case that we 
also have reasons to accept that the principle of equality is compatible with 
different political entitlements for different classes of emigrant stakeholders. 
This is not to rule out this possibility but merely to note that a compelling 
argument would need to be made to justify the permissibility of the relevant 
inequality. 
  
Widening the Scope 
Having addressed the issue of voting rights for both resident non-citizens and 
non-resident citizens, let me know offer some reasons for widening the scope 
of consideration from voting rights to rights of political participation more 
generally, where by rights of political participation I refer additionally to such 
core rights as freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and protest, 
freedom to join, and form, political associations and freedom to stand for 
public office. Having presented these reasons, I will go on to consider the 
relationship between different modes of membership and the degrees to 
which those exhibiting these modes should enjoy rights of political 
participation. 
 
The most obvious reasons for widening the focus to engage the general 
terrain of rights of political participation are twofold. The first is that political 
autonomy in democratic states cannot be reduced to voting rights. Since 
political autonomy concerns having at the very least effective opportunities for 
publicly communicating (and reflecting on) views and arguments, and for 23 
 
influencing the political agenda, it will require a wider range of rights of 
political participation. The second can be drawn out by reflecting briefly on the 
two cases of resident non-citizens and non-resident citizens. Suppose that we 
take the view that the political autonomy of denizens can be secured short of 
full political membership. In such a context, the immediate question concerns 
what rights of political participation are sufficient to secure their political 
autonomy and, if more than one answer to this question is possible, the 
further question of the relative merits of different possible bundles of rights of 
political participation for that end. In the case of expatriate citizens, there are 
two issues: first, what rights of political participation should they be entitled to 
independent of whether they are permitted to vote and, second, should the 
decision on whether they are enfranchised affect the rights of political 
participation to which they are entitled?  
 
If we consider the case of resident non-citizens who choose not to naturalise 
in contexts where such an option is easily accessible and bears no additional 
burdens (i.e., dual nationality is permitted), we can reasonably presume that 
these residents stand in a broadly instrumental relationship to the democratic 
state as a regime of rule and, hence, have protective reasons to engage in 
political participation as well as a legitimate claim to engage in political 
participation grounded on their subjection to the political authority of the state. 
Does this mode of membership have any implications for the range of rights of 
political participation to which they are entitled? I think that there are grounds 
for suggesting so. In general, an instrumental relation to the state entitles 
individuals to those rights that are fundamentally concerned with the formation, 
expression and defence of their legitimate interests which include, minimally, 
rights of free political speech, rights of association and rights of assembly and 
protest. I have already argued that, in the case of resident non-citizens, it 
extends to national voting rights in legislative elections but it should be added 
that the same argument leads to the view that resident non-citizens must be 
excluded from constitutional referenda that address fundamental relations 
between citizens and presumptively excluded from executive elections. What 
of joining and founding political associations and political parties? There are 
good protective reasons for resident non-citizens to be able to join political 24 
 
associations (though some may reasonably be reserved for citizens) and 
found political associations (which may reasonably be restricted to resident 
non-citizens) to represent their interests effectively in the polity. For the same 
reason, they should enjoy a right to join political parties but not, I think, to 
found political parties unless and until it can be shown (before a court) that the 
existing political parties will not be reasonable representatives of their 
interests. I advance this claim on the basis that political parties are not simply 
carriers of sectional interests of various kinds which they express through 
programmes of domestic legislation but also intended as offering competing 
substantive visions of the political community and its future between which 
that community may choose. In this respect, a political party should be seen 
as both a vehicle for protection of political interests within a regime of rule and 
a medium of expression of political values within a political community. For 
much the same reasons, I do not think that resident non-citizens should be 
entitled to stand for national election unless and until it is demonstrable that 
their interests are being systematically ignored by the national legislature and 
even here it may be more suitable to adopt mechanisms of judicial review. 
 
Turning to the case of first and second generation non-resident citizens, we 
can note that there are some limited (though significant) instrumental relations 
to the state of origin as a regime of rule and, typically, a non-instrumental 
attachment to this state as a form of political community. A significant feature 
of this mode of membership is that the majority of domestic law will not be 
consequential for expatriates in terms of their interests. Given that expatriates 
stand in both a (limited) instrumental and non-instrumental relationship to the 
democratic state and, hence, have both (some) protective reasons and 
expressive reasons to engage in political participation as well as a legitimate 
claim to engage in political participation based on their subjection to the 
political authority of the state and the interdependence of their individual well-
being and the flourishing of the state, what implications follow for the rights of 
political participation which they are owed? In general, this mode of 
membership supports entitlement to rights of free political speech, rights of 
association and rights of assembly and protest which play both protective and 
expressive roles. I have also already argued that expatriate citizens must be 25 
 
entitled to participate in constitutional referenda and that there is at least a 
presumption in favour of their enjoying national voting rights, although here I 
should make clear that I think that this presumption applies to both national 
executive elections and legislative elections, albeit that the reasons for this 
are different in each case and, in my view, stronger in relation to the former 
type of election. In the case of electing a President, the same reasons that 
support the exclusion of resident non-citizens support the inclusion of 
expatriate citizens. In the case of national legislative elections, while it is the 
case that these express both instrumental and instrumental dimensions of the 
expatriate citizen’s relationship to the state, the claim is significantly qualified 
by the non-consequentiality (from an instrumental standpoint) of much of the 
legislation debated and enacted within national legislative settings. In relation 
to joining and founding political organisations and political parties, it seems 
that the specific mode of membership of expatriate citizen’s should entitle 
them to join and found political associations and to join but not found political 
parties. The reason for this restriction is the flipside of the related restriction 
on resident non-citizens, namely, that political parties not only articulate a 
substantive ethical self-understanding for the political community but also 
seek to articulate and protect the interests of a diverse range of sectoral 
interests through programmes of domestic legislation. A similarly mirrored 
relationship to the resident non-citizen is exhibited in the right to stand for 
national office. Here it is not simply the fact that the practical requirements of 
the role involve residence (which is a contingent constraint) but that, as a 
representative, the expatriate citizen would not bear the consequences of 
much of the legislation which they were involved in enacting. In the case of 
founding political parties and standing for national election, it seems 
reasonable that the joint requirements of residence and national citizenship 
are met.  
  
Thus far in considering rights of political participation, essentially two grounds 
for such rights have been in play – being subject to the rule of a state and 
having one’s well-bring non-contingently bound to the fate of the state – but 
there is a further ground on which claims to rights of political participation may 
legitimately be based, namely, having one’s morally significant interests 26 
 
affected by the decisions of the state and I will conclude this discussion by 
attending to the fundamental issue raised for transnational citizenship by this 
principle, namely, the inclusion of non-resident, non-citizens. In taking up the 
all affected interests principle, I will begin by briefly clarifying why this principle 
has not been itself considered as a ground for claims to full inclusion within 
the demos, that is, as a principle of transnational citizenship, before noting 
that the rejection of this principle as a criterion of membership of the demos 
does not entail its rejection as grounding a specific mode of membership in 
the democratic state.  
 
Why should the fact that one’s morally significant interests are affected by a 
decision of a polity of which one is neither a resident nor a citizen ground a 
right to inclusion within the demos? On Goodin’s argument, the all-affected 
interests principle is grounded on the importance of the intermeshed interests 
of persons, arguing that ‘common reciprocal interests in one another’s action 
and choices are what makes these groups [e.g., territorial, historical, national] 
appropriate units for collective decision-making’ (Goodin, 2007: 48). But what 
work is done by this appeal to interlinked interests? Ironically, this view entails 
that having an interest in membership of a polity or structure of governance is 
not predicated on one’s interests being affected by some decision of that 
polity but, rather, on one’s interests being intermeshed with the interests of 
others such that one has a common interest with these others of being a 
member of a legal and/or political community that regulates the relations 
between the members of this community. This appeal to interlinked interests 
is a recursive principle in the sense that while persons whose interests are 
affected by a decision made by a given polity do not thereby have an interest 
in membership of that polity, in virtue of having an interest affected by a 
decision of that polity they do have a common interest with all other persons 
affected by that decision in membership of a legal and/or political community 
that has powers to regulate the decision made by the interest-affecting polity. 
This does not however provide a normative basis for the all affected interests 
principle. As Baubock notes, the all affected interests principle ‘builds on the 
plausible idea that democratic decisions have to be justified towards all whose 
who are affected by them, but implausibly derives from such a duty of 27 
 
justification a criterion of participation and representation in the decision-
making itself.’ (2009b: 15) Thus, while discussions of the all-affected principle 
are right to highlight the significance of intermeshed interests, the politically 
indiscriminate nature of the principle cannot do what is necessary for a 
consideration of the fundamental question of entitlement to political 
membership, namely, specify the type of interests whose intermeshing 
generates a claim to membership of a political community. Put another way: 
the “all affected interests” principle substantiates ethical duties for 
democratic legislators to take externally affected interests into account, 
to seek agreements with the representatives of externally affected 
polities and to transfer some decision on global problems to 
international institutions, but … it cannot provide a criterion for 
determining claims to citizenship and political participation.’ (Baubock, 
2009b: 18)  
However, that it cannot provide such a criterion does not mean that it does not 
provide a ground for a specific mode of membership in the democratic state, 
that is, for certain rights of political participation. 
 
To consider this claim, it is worth reflecting on what is involved in the thought 
that states should consider the morally significant interests of non-resident, 
non-citizens when involved in decision-making and owe a duty of justification 
to all whose morally significant interest are affected by their decisions. Notice 
that considering these interests entails both that those who are liable to be 
affected are aware of the various options being considered by a state in 
relation to a given policy-choice and that the decision-making state is aware of 
the interests of those whose interests are liable to be affected. The former 
imposes a duty of publicity on the decision-making state and correlative right 
to information for the relevantly affected parties; the latter generates a duty on 
those affected to make the decision-making state aware of the ways in which 
particular policy choices are likely to impact upon them. In the case of 
democratic states, in which sovereignty lies ultimately with the people, this 
duty on external affected parties entails a right not only to communicate with 
the representatives of the state (e.g., diplomats and politicians) but to 
communicate directly with the people themselves and to make arguments and 28 
 
representations to them. Where the external affected parties are members of 
other states, it may seem that this right is accommodated through inter-state 
diplomatic relations but two points hold against taking this to be sufficient. 
First, the external affected parties may be scattered across several states in 
such a way that their affected interests are not a major concern for any 
particular state. Second, even if the external affected parties represent a 
significant body within a given state, that state may be part of the problem 
insofar its government pursue policies without regard to (or even with counter-
regard to) its peoples interests. Moreover, given the practical relationship 
between the right to freedom of political speech, the right to found political 
associations to represent one’s interests and the right to engage in peaceful 
protest (when on the territory of the decision-making state) in modern politics, 
it would seem that external affected parties should enjoy these rights of 
political participation as conditions for enabling the decision-making state 
adequately to take into account external affected interests. Since practically, 
however, democratic states make a large range of decisions which generate 
morally significant affects on external parties and the practical specification of 
who will be affected is often hard to determine with any precision, it seems 
plausible to suggest that this feature of modern political life is best dealt with 
through the existing system of international diplomacy in conjunction with a 
general right of non-resident, non-citizens to freedom of political speech 
across borders, the founding of political associations in the decision-making 
state and a territorially-conditional right to engage in peaceful protest. The 
right to freedom of expression declared in Article 19 of the UNDHR is a good 
example of just such as rights: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right 
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, 
receive and impart information and ideas through any media and 
regardless of frontiers. (my italics)  
This is a mode of political membership because, even if it is practically 
instantiated through human rights, it represents a relationship of entitlement 
and obligation between a given state and those whose interests are affected 
by its decisions. 
 29 
 
These reflection on the all affected interests principle not only further support 
the point that widening the scope of reflection from voting rights to rights of 
political participation is needful for an adequate normative account of 
transnational citizenship, they underscore this point by directing us to the 
need to expand the concept of transnational citizenship to include a specific 
mode of membership which encompasses externally affected parties who 
have a claim to participate in certain ways in the political life of a self-
governing state in which they are neither residents nor citizens. 
 
Conclusion 
Transnational citizenship represents a fundamental reconfiguration of political 
membership and normative theoretical accounts of this phenomenon, most 
prominently in the work of Baubock, Carens and Rubio-Marin, have focused 
on the most central practical policy areas impacted by this phenomenon, 
namely, membership and voting rights. My concern in this article has been to 
argue for a refocusing of attention on modes of membership and political 
participation. First, I have argued that general considerations of political 
participation suggest that we need to think not only about degrees of 
membership but about modes of membership, and indeed I have claimed that 
we cannot adequately address the former with attending to the latter. Second, 
and integral to this refocusing of attention of attention on modes of 
membership, is a shift from voting rights to the wider range of rights of political 
participation. In making this argument, I have both been concerned to review 
the leading arguments within the field of normative political theory and to 
show both how some tensions and problems within existing debates can be 
overcome, and to argue for a more expansive conception of transnational 
citizenship. Although this article does not engage in the more detailed and 
specific contextual work that would be needed for a full account of the rights 
of political participation appropriate to a specific mode of membership in a 
given democratic state, it does, I hope, establish the value of, and provide 
some guidance for, the generation of such an account. 
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